There are two puzzling phenomena in the international finance literature. The first puzzle is commonly called the home bias, whereby investors strongly depart from the well-diversified world market portfolio, as they allocate a relatively large fraction of their wealth to domestic equities and a relatively small fraction to foreign equities. The second puzzle is high turnover of foreign asset holdings, whereby investors turnover their holdings of foreign securities more frequently than domestic equities.
There is a vast literature on the "home bias" puzzle (Errunza and Losq (1985) ), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Wheatley (2001)). While the puzzle is not completely resolved, a number of papers show that the home bias is due to the information disadvantage (Kang and Stulz (1997) , Brennan and Cao (1997) ) and unfamiliarity of investors (Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) , Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) ) withn foreign markets However, we know very little about how investors trade their domestic and foreign portfolio holdings, and in particular how significant and robust is the stylized fact that the investors trade their foreign assets much more often than the domestic ones. On one hand, we have the influential paper by Tesar and Werner (1995) that documented, based on cross-border capital flows in five OECD countries, that foreign investors' turnover is 10 times that one of domestic investors. On the other hand, Warnock (2002) argues that Tesar and Werner data over-estimates the turnover measure and shows, using comprehensive investor surveys data, that foreign turnover rates are much lower than previously reported.
Nevertheless, both studies show that transaction costs cannot explain the high turnover by foreign investors.
What is the reason for the high turnover by foreign investors? Unfortunately, there is a lack of theoretical literature to distinguish between the propensity of foreign and domestic investors to trade the same security. Even worse, there is little understanding on why investors would trade so much in the first place. According to Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , difference in information set alone is not sufficient to generate trading volume. For trading to occur, it requires non-speculative motives in the form of endowment or preference shocks and exogenous liquidity traders. While some theoretical literature have investigated how trading occurs as a consequence of difference of opinion (Varian (1985) , Harris and Raviv (1993) , and Kandel and Pearson (1995) ), there remains an open question on why investors would diverge so much in opinion that can generate the amount of trading volume in financial markets.
Instead of explaining trading volume based on rational motives, recent papers have attributed the trading to behavioral biases of investors. Odean (1999) argues that retail investors are overconfident in trading by showing that those who trade more frequently incur lower returns than those who trade less. Odean (1998a) and Gervais and Odean (2001) show that individual investors gain confidence after the market experiences high return, as they mistakenly attribute gains in stock trading to their ability to pick stocks. Some recent papers survey the investors and develop direct measures of overconfidence, and find that investors who are judged to be more over-confident will tend to trade more (Glaser and Martin Weber (2003) , Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2006) and Dorn and Huberman (2005) ). Stateman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) provide further support for the existence of investor overconfidence by showing an increase in trading volume subsequent to upward market movements in the United States. Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2006) find a positive relation between past returns and trading volume for 46 countries, and attribute this partially to investor overconfidence. Nevertheless, none of these studies has direct implications as to (i) whether investors should trade foreign securities more often than domestic securities, and (ii) what influences investors trade in one foreign market more often than the others.
In this paper, we employ a rich and interesting dataset that contains equity holdings of mutual funds from 29 countries, with a breakdown of their trades across 48 countries from 1999 to 2004, and examine whether investors do trade foreign securities more often than domestic securities. We document that indeed investors trade foreign stocks more often than the domestic ones. Although the foreign turnover is only slightly 10% more than the domestic turnover, instead of 10 times as reported in Tesar and Werner (1995) , the difference is robust and prevalent in 24 out of 29 countries.
We then explore the possible explanations for the higher turnover by foreign investors. While considering a number of factors in general, we are particularly interested in examining whether information asymmetry and familiarity, the two effects that have been shown to affect the home bias, can also explain the higher turnover of foreign securities. To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of theoretical literature that provides the link from the home bias to high turnover of foreign securities.
Although Brennan and Cao (1997) discuss in the introduction that "The assumption of information asymmetry is shown to imply a home-bias in portfolio holdings and a high turnover rate on foreign than on domestic portfolio" (page 1854), their model examines the direction of domestic versus foreign portfolio investment flows rather than explaining their frequency of turnover. The only paper we are aware of is Guidolin (2005) who develops a two-country overlapping-generations model to explain both the home bias and high turnover puzzles. 1 The sparse research on this issue points out the importance of ascertaining the empirical link between the home bias and turnover of foreign securities.
Information asymmetry and familiarity are two interrelated phenomena widely used to explain the home bias puzzle. According to the information asymmetry hypothesis, foreigners are discouraged from investing abroad because they have less information than locals about domestic securities. A few papers
show that foreign investors earn lower trading profits than domestic investors, providing direct evidence that domestic investors have information advantage over foreign investors 2 . To a certain extent, the information asymmetry among domestic and foreign investors is affected by information disclosure and corporate governance of a country. For a country with bad corporate governance and poor information disclosure, foreign investors are unable to access the material information and face more information disadvantage, and will be discouraged from investing into the local companies. Anecdotal evidence
shows that the quality of corporate governance affects foreign and domestic investors' decision about whether or not to buy stocks in certain companies (McKinsey&Company (2003a and b) ).
Lack of familiarity with a foreign market will also discourage investors from investing into the market. While familiarity might be related to information asymmetry, evidence indicates that familiarity 1 Guidolin (2005) assumes that while investors from both countries receive identical information flows, domestic investors start off with less precise prior beliefs concerning foreign fundamentals. On a learning path, differences in beliefs and estimation risk generate portfolio biases that match the empirical evidence: home bias in equity portfolios and trend-chasing in international flows. In addition, due to the higher volatility of the estimates of foreign state variables, his model produces excessive turnover in foreign securities. Epstein and Miao (2003) also derive a model whereby agents perceive some security returns as ambiguous, and attempt to explain the home-bias puzzles and the turnover by the different agents.
is much more psychologically based, as the investors are simply influenced by language and culture (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), geographic proximity (Coval and Moskowtiz (2001) , Zhu (2002) , Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005) ), and immigrant origin (Bhattacharya and Groznik (2003) ). The above familiarity attributes can be regarded as behavioral biases of foreign investors, rather than reflecting their informational disadvantage relative to local investors. Investors' familiarity with local securities may incorrectly make them believe that they enjoy superior information. The familiarity bias may also cause investors to under-estimate the risk or over-estimate the expected return (French and Poterba (1991b) ), causing them to overweight domestic equities and underweight foreign equities.
As we have pointed out, there is no theoretical work that provides the link between the home bias and portfolio turnover in foreign markets. Our proposition that informational asymmetry and lack of familiarity contributes to higher turnover in foreign securities is surely a conjecture without rigorous theoretical foundation. However, while our arguments are heuristic, there is some supporting empirical evidence. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) report that within the United States, fund managers trade far more frequently in their distant holdings than in their local holdings. Huberman (2001) finds not only that investors buy the shares of the Regional Bell Operating company of the area they live (rather than other Bell companies), but they also appear to hold them for much longer. Therefore, in general, for the securities that investors appear to know more, they will adopt relatively long-term strategies, holding them for longer periods and trading less frequently.
A major contribution of the paper is to investigate whether the information disadvantage or lack of familiarity of mutual fund managers in foreign markets contributes to higher trading volume in those markets. To test for the information disadvantage hypothesis, we hypothesize that foreign turnover is negatively related to the quality of information disclosure of the country. We conjecture that the lower the quality of information disclosure of a country, and the more information disadvantage foreign investors face, the higher their turnover in that country will be. To test for the familiarity effect, we examine the "closeness" between the host country of a mutual fund and the target country that the fund invests into, such as the existence of common language, geographical proximity, and the amount of bilateral trades between the two countries. We hypothesize that if two countries are closer to each other, the fund managers are more familiar with the foreign country, and their turnover of securities in that country will be lower. Besides the variables associated with information disclosure and familiarity, we include country variables to proxy for stock market development and investor protection, as well as some control variables such as market returns and market volatility. This allows a comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting propensity of mutual fund managers to trade in the domestic versus foreign markets.
Our results indicate that turnover in foreign securities is higher in the countries that are less developed, have less investor protection, have lower information disclosure standard, and are less familiar to the fund managers. On the other hand, the relationship is much weaker for turnover in domestic securities. Therefore, the determinants of turnover in foreign and domestic securities are quite different, with the sensitivity of turnover in foreign securities to some country characteristics being much higher.
The negative relationship between turnover in foreign securities and quality of information disclosure or degree of familiarity are especially interesting as they are consistent with our conjecture that investors will trade more in the stocks that they know less, and this could well explain why the turnover in foreign securities is much higher than the turnover in domestic securities.
We also find evidence of a positive relationship between turnover in foreign securities and the contemporaneous return in the foreign market. This is consistent with the assertion that mutual fund managers exhibit behavioral biases as they have limited attention on foreign markets. When a foreign market performs well, it attracts the attention of fund managers who will then participate in that market more actively (Barber and Odean (2005) ). The evidence is also consistent with the positive feedback trading strategies implemented by institutional investors who will buy foreign securities following a rise of the foreign market (Brennan and Cao (1997) ), causing an increase of foreign turnover in the up market.
On the other hand, when the foreign market declines, due to short sale constraints, mutual fund managers are confined to sell their foreign portfolio holdings. Therefore, foreign turnover will not increase as much in the down market. Finally, we find that the positive relationship between turnover in a foreign market and contemporaneous foreign market returns is attenuated if the foreign market has higher information disclosure standards or is more familiar to mutual fund managers.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the data and construction of portfolio turnover of mutual funds. Section II introduces the country-level characteristics that will affect the turnover. Section III conducts empirical analyses. Section IV concludes the paper. File, containing the security number, security name, country code, security price, and shares outstanding;
I. Data and Portfolio Turnover of Mutual Funds
and (iii) the Portfolio Holdings File, reporting the fund number, security number, number of shares held by the fund, and net changes in shares held since prior report dates.
A problem associated with the dataset is that the country code refers to the country of incorporation (host country), rather than the country of residence for the mutual fund investors. Thus, some of the funds might in fact be feeder funds, and this could pose a problem when we need to differentiate between the domestic and foreign holdings and thereby domestic and foreign turnover.
While we cannot resolve this problem, any failure to differentiate between the domestic and foreign markets would simply bias us against finding excess turnover in foreign securities. Furthermore, while the mutual fund investors might reside outside the host country, the fund managers might reside within the country. Since the trading decision is made by fund managers, our classification method of domestic and foreign turnover might still be relevant.
A key variable of interest in the study is the portfolio turnover of the mutual funds. We follow Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2005) to measure how frequently the mutual fund managers rotate the positions on all the stocks within a mutual fund (churn rate). Although some of the funds record stockholdings on a bi-annual basis, we decide to calculate the turnover based on annual stockholdings so as to include as many mutual funds as possible. Also, a fund will be included in calculating the turnover only if it has more than three stock positions. The turnover of fund i in country j from year t-1 to year t is calculated as follows:
N is the number of shares of stock k held by fund i at year t, t , k P is the price of stock k, and t , k P Δ is the change of price of stock k from year t-1 to year t. It could be shown that equation (1) could be reduced to
In the extreme case that the mutual fund does not trade any stock during the period, then We recognize that our measure suffers a few problems as an indication of the turnover rate of mutual funds. First, while the share prices ( t , k P ) in Equation (2) are based on the last date of the year, the number of shares ( ij t , k N ) in the mutual fund dataset is not necessarily at the end-year. Although there is a potential mismatch between the dates of stock prices and number of shares, we do not think this constitutes a systematic bias for our empirical analysis.
Second, the stockholdings in our dataset are recorded on an annual basis, which are less frequent than those U.S. studies based on quarterly stockholding data (for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , and Chan, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000), Wermers (2000) ). Therefore, our turnover measure captures the portfolio adjustment on a longer term basis. If mutual funds trade stocks much more frequently, say on a monthly basis, but leave the stock positions pretty much unchanged on an annual basis, the short-term trading will not be reflected in our turnover measure. In that case, our turnover measure will underestimate the portfolio turnover of mutual funds. However, since the primary focus of the paper is not to derive a precise turnover estimate, but to explain the cross-sectional variation of portfolio turnover across different markets within a mutual fund, the underestimation bias should not pose a problem as long as the bias is random and does not have a systematic pattern with respect to country characteristics that are used to explain the turnover.
Third, the turnover measure is sensitive to fund inflows and outflows. When there are fund inflows (outflows), the fund needs to buy (sell) additional shares, so that the turnover reflects trading due to redemption/subscription rather than portfolio rebalancing. Therefore the more volatile the fund flows, the higher the turnover measure. Nevertheless, since our focus is to explain the turnover of securities within the 3 If the fund i does not invest in country j, a missing value will be assigned to ij t TURN . same mutual fund across different markets, the turnover due to fund flows will not pose any systematic bias to our analysis. TURN for fund i at year t, take a 5-year average, and finally calculate the cross-sectional average across all funds. For easiness, we divided the turnover measure by two, so it ranges from 0 to 1 (100%). The cross-sectional average of domestic turnover is contained in Column (2) of Table 1 . During the 2000-04 period, the domestic turnover ranges from 35.4% for Ireland to 67% for Brazil. As for foreign turnover, for ease of presentation, for each country i, we present the grand average of turnover across all funds outside all foreign countries. Column (3) of Table 1 shows that funds from Denmark turned over the foreign part of their portfolio by 43.4% while Greek funds by 69.8%. Panel A of Table 1 also reports stock market turnover for the respective country obtained from Global Stock Markets Factbooks, which is defined as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to the average market capitalization in a given country.
During this 5-year period, the average turnover ranges from 2.1% for Luxemburg to 172.4% for India.
As noted in Table 1 , foreign turnover is generally higher than domestic turnover. The average of domestic turnover across all 29 host countries is 48.6%, while the average of foreign turnover is 53.8 %.
The difference is smaller than what is reported in Tesar and Wermers (1995) , but significant when compared to the results in Warnock (2001) . Furthermore, the difference is robust at the country level, with 24 out of 29 countries having mutual funds that trade foreign stocks more often than domestic stocks. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the mutual funds for each country. United States has the highest number of funds (4763), followed by Germany (4363) and Spain (2489), while New Zealand has the lowest number of funds (14). This is similar to results presented in Ferreira and Matos (2005) that report Germany and Spain have the second and third highest number of funds after the United States.
Funds in United States are the most diversified, as they have the highest number of stock holdings (68.5), while funds in Spain are the least diversified, with the lowest number of stock holdings (13.3). Funds in the United States are also the biggest, with an average market value of $564.4m, followed by the funds in Italy ($255.4m), while funds in Portugal are the smallest ($28.9m).
II. Hypotheses on relationship between portfolio turnover and country characteristics
In this section, we introduce some country-level variables and discuss how they will affect the portfolio turnover of mutual funds. Table III 
A Stock Market Development
The level of stock market development is a good indication of market liquidity. When a stock market is more developed, it will have higher liquidity and lower transaction costs. Therefore, the liquidity story predicts higher mutual fund turnover in the more developed markets. On the other hand, a less developed market might have more speculation so that there will be higher turnover (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). The speculation story predicts higher mutual fund turnover in the less developed markets.
We use three variables as proxies for stock market development; these variables were found to affect cross-border holdings and foreign investors' trading behavior (Chan, Covrig and Ng (20005)). The first variable is the transaction cost estimate (COST). The variable, which is also studied by Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001) , are from Elkins/McSherry Co. and reflect trading costs incurred by institutional traders, including pension funds, investment managers, and brokerage firms. The estimates are based on commissions, fees, and market impact costs during the 1998-2002 period. We obtain estimates for 42 countries, with the estimates ranging from 19.6 basis points for Japan to 119.9 basis points for Venezuela. Other things being equal, we predict the portfolio turnover of mutual funds to be negatively related to COST.
The size of the stock market (SIZE), expressed as the ratio of total market capitalization to the country's GDP, is obtained from Standard and Poor's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 2001 to 2005, and ranges from 4.8% (Venezuela) to 363% (Hong Kong). If investors speculate more in the smaller market, we would expect the turnover to be higher there, so that we predict the portfolio turnover is negatively related to SIZE.
We also use a dummy variable (DUMEMG) that equals 1 for an emerging market and 0 otherwise, to control for any specific characteristics of emerging markets not accounted by the other variables. Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) show that the turnover is less sensitive to cost in emerging markets than in developed markets. Possible explanations are that smaller and less developed markets might be prone to more noise and uninformed speculative trading that could force the traders to reduce their investment horizon and trade more. Therefore, after transaction costs are controlled for, we predict higher mutual fund turnover of securities from emerging markets (i.e. DUMEMG equals 1).
B. Investor Protection
Existing literature shows that legal protection and corporate governance can affect the level of investor participation. La Porta, Lopez-De Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (henceforth, LLSV) (1997) argue that the legal rules that protect investors from expropriation from insiders increase the willingness of outside investors to participate in equity markets. Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2005) show that firms whose ownership structures are more prone to governance problems or expropriation by controlling managers and families will attract significantly less U.S. investment. However, some investors might benefit from weak corporate governance. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) find that while outside investors that generally enjoy only security benefits are less likely to invest in companies with weak corporate governance, individuals connected with company insiders are more likely to invest in these companies.
Although the literature does not have any direct discussion on the turnover in relationship to legal institutions, there are still some implications for the effect of legal protection on the turnover. According to LLSV, countries with weak investor protection have narrow capital markets and concentrated inside ownership (i.e. less float) due to low participation by outside investors. The smaller float of equity and narrower equity markets will therefore lead to higher cost of liquidity, resulting in lower turnover. Indeed, Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) provide supporting evidence by showing that the trading costs are significantly lower for American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from countries with better measures of legal protection. Nevertheless, since we will explicitly include the trading cost variable (COST) in our empirical analysis, the incremental explanatory power of investor protection measures for mutual fund turnover due to the liquidity effect might be small. On the other hand, the weak investor protection would mean that the securities are more information-sensitive so that investors will monitor the securities more closely, leading to more active trading. As a result, we predict the mutual fund turnover will be higher in countries with weak investor protection.
We construct three measures for investor protection. The first is the corporate governance measure (DGOV), which is based on the governance ratings of Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and has been used in Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2005) . We define DGOV to be 1 if the governance measure is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. The second is LEGAL, which is the product of antidirector and rule of law, and has been used in Durnve and Kim (2005) . The values of anti-director rights and rule of law are obtained from LLSV (1998) for most of the countries, except for Luxembourg, China, Czech, Egypt, Hungary, Poland and Russia. The value of LEGAL ranges from 0 (Belgium, Italy, and Mexico) to 5 (United States). The third is the risk of expropriation index (EXPROP), which is constructed by the International Country Risk agency, although the index is not available for China, Czech, Hungary, Poland and Russia. This index has a scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for greater risks. Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom have the lowest expropriation risk with a score of 9.98, while Philippines has the highest expropriation risk with a score of 5.52.
C. Information Disclosure
There are two opposite effects of market transparency on portfolio turnover. A more transparent market will reduce adverse selection problem and enhances the market liquidity, thus increasing the propensity of investors to trade, especially for those liquidity traders who would like to minimize the trading cost. However, that effect is most likely to be captured by the Stock Market Development group of variables.
On the other hand, a more transparent market allows more frequent dissemination of information, allowing investors to react to information in a gradual fashion. A more transparent market would avoid the panic situation whereby investors will trade erratically in reaction to large surprises in the market.
Based on a database of international mutual funds based in the United States, Gelos and Wei (2002) provide evidence that fund managers tend to invest more in countries with more transparent markets, however, they also find that investors herd more in less transparent markets, suggesting that the portfolio rebalancing decision is related to the amount of information being available in the market.
Our expectation is that mutual funds turn over less frequently the securities from more transparent markets.
We use two variables, DMDISC and OPACITY, to account for information disclosure and market transparency. The disclosure level, DMDISC, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country's disclosure score is greater than median and 0 otherwise. The disclosure score, which is also used by Jin and Myers (2006) , is from Global Competitiveness Reports and is based on results from surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 about the level and effectiveness of financial disclosure in different countries. The measure of opaqueness (OPACITY), from Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) , ranges from 0 to 5, with higher scores for more opaqueness. Belgium, Canada, United States are the least opaque countries, while Japan, Chile, and Indonesia are the most opaque.
D. Familiarity Variables
There is a vast literature that documents the "familiarity effect", i.e. the tendency of investors to invest in stocks that they are more familiar with, either because they are geographically close or are more well recognized (Kang and Stulz (1997) , Coval and Moskowtiz (1999) ). The "familiarity effect" is strongly believed to be related to the home bias exhibited in the international portfolio holdings as investors tend to hold stocks of firms that share the investors' same language and cultural background (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ) and Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005)).
There is, however, little theoretical reasoning on how the "familiarity effect" affects the turnover.
Based on a rational theory, familiarity alone should not affect the trading frequency of investors. Suppose an investor is familiar with a particular stock because she has more information about it. While better informed means spotting more "buy" and "sell" opportunities, the counterparty would not want to trade if he knows that he has less information. But if we deviate from the rational model, behavioral biases could link investors' trading activity to their familiarity with the stocks. The effect of familiarity might give investors the illusion that they have superior information than others, leading them to be overconfident about the stocks. If investors make more trading decision when they are overconfident (Odean 1998a) , their turnover in the familiar stocks will be higher.
However, such effect of familiarity is not observed in the empirical evidence. Quite contrary, Huberman (2001) finds not only that investors tend to buy shares of the Regional Bell Operating company of the area they live, instead of other Bell companies, they are also inclined to own the company in a "buy-and-hold" fashion, rather than trading the stock actively. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) also report that fund managers trade far more frequently in their distant holdings than in their local holdings. Therefore, while investors are induced to buy the more familiar stocks, the familiarity does not appear to render any information advantage that would cause them to trade these stocks more frequently. Instead, when investors are more familiar with the stocks, they feel more comfortable holding them for a longer period and not trade actively. Therefore, we predict that mutual fund managers will trade less frequently in the foreign markets that they are more familiar with.
We admit familiarity could be a manifestation of the information asymmetry that foreign investors face. Massa and Simonov (2006) has differentiated between "behavioral-based familiarity" and "information-based familiarity", and find evidence in support of the latter one. They argue that "familiarity "is a cheap way of obtaining information. They show that for those investors who get better informed as a result of their location or profession, a change to their residence or jobs will have relatively smaller effect on their portfolio choice since it takes time for them to absorb the information embedded in the relocation or new profession. Therefore, familiarity is a substitute for better information, and its importance decreases when the investor has access to more information.
Our analysis does not seek to investigate whether familiarity is "behavioral-based" or information-based". In fact, the lack of information on investor characteristics in our dataset precludes us from distinguishing between the two. Nevertheless, even if familiarity reflects "information availability" rather than "behavioral heuristics", the prediction of familiarity variables on turnover remains the same.
If mutual fund managers are less familiar with the foreign market because they have less information about it, then according to the information asymmetry hypothesis, they should trade the foreign securities more often.
Unlike the variables in other categories, the value of a familiarity variable is not fixed for the host country but varies with the target country that the host country is related to. Instead of reporting the familiarity variable for each pair of countries, Table 3 reports the average of each familiarity variable across all pairs for a given country. Following Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005), we construct three familiarity variables. The first is a dummy variable for common language (DUMLANG) that equals 1 if country i and j share a major language and 0 otherwise. The data are compiled from the World Factbook 1999, which contains the major or official languages of countries from all over the world. As indicated in Table 3 , countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada share more common language, while countries such as Denmark, Greece, Italy have their own languages. The second variable is geographical proximity. Geographical distance (DISTANCE) is the bilateral distance between capital cities of two countries, and is obtained from www.nber.org/~wei. The most remote countries are Australia and New Zealand, with an average geographical distance of 13102 km and 14300 km from the other countries. As expected, European countries enjoy the closest proximity compared with the other countries, as almost a half of the countries in our sample are from Europe, with the average geographical distance ranges from 5563 km for Denmark to 5910 for Ireland. The third variable is the amount of bilateral trades (TRADEB), with values ranging from 0 to 1. The raw trade data is up to 1998, and is also from www.nber.org/~wei. For each of the 48 countries in our sample, we sum a country's dollar exports with its dollar imports with the remaining 47 countries, and calculate the weighted trade of the country with the others. Suppose the value of TRADEB between the United States and (host country for the mutual fund) and United Kingdom is 0.1, it means that 10% of the total U.S. trade (imports plus exports) is with the United Kingdom. By construction, the mean of TRADEB must be equal to 1/47, as each country trade with the remaining 47 countries in the sample. Therefore, Table 3 presents the median of the TRADEB instead.
We argue that DUMLANG, DISTANCE, and TRADEB are good indicators of how familiar the mutual fund managers in country i are with country j. If DUMLANG takes on the value of 1, DISTANCE is smaller, and TRADEB is higher, then fund managers in country i are more familiar with country j. We predict that turnover of mutual fund from host country i in country j will decrease with DUMLANG and TRADEB, and increase with DISTANCE.
E. Other control variables
In addition to the variables classified under the four categories above, we include several other variables that have the potential of explaining the portfolio turnover of mutual funds.
(i) Home Bias
Home bias variable (BIAS) is a country level bilateral variable that measures the extent to which the weighting of a country in the mutual funds portfolio of a host country deviates from the weighting of that country in the world market portfolio. Following Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) , the home bias is defined as the log ratio of the country's share in the mutual fund holdings to the world market capitalization weight of that country. If the fund investments are in the domestic market then the BIAS will measure the home bias, and if there are in a foreign country the BIAS will measure the foreign bias. Table 3 reports the BIAS of different countries from the perspective of foreign investors. We notice that the values are uniformly negative for all countries, indicating that the investors tend to underweight the foreign markets. On a relative basis, Venezuela is the most underweighted by foreign investors, compared to the United Kingdom which is the least underweighted.
Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) show that how much a country will exhibit home bias in their mutual fund holdings can be explained by the familiarity variables. When a country is more remote from the rest of the world, domestic investors will invest more into that country, while foreign investors will invest less. Therefore, home bias could be a manifestation of the familiarity effect. Certainly, if our familiarity variables can capture the full familiarity effect, there will be no explanatory power for BIAS in explaining the mutual fund turnover. However, if BIAS captures residual familiarity effect, we expect that turnover of mutual funds will be higher in the country that is less familiar to foreign investors, and this is characterized by a lower BIAS (more negative BIAS) for the country.
(ii) Contemporaneous market returns
We include market returns in the contemporaneous year (RET1), calculated using local currency country indices retrieved from DATASTREAM. There is a stylized fact of a positive relationship between stock market volume and contemporaneous market returns (Karpoff (1987) . In a study of 46 markets and based on daily and weekly data, Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2006) find that the positive relation between turnover and past returns holds for most of the countries, although there is substantial cross-sectional variation across the countries, with the relation being much stronger for developing markets, more opaque countries, and more volatile economies. They also find that the relation is stronger for individual investors, and weaker for foreign investors who tend to be institutional investors.
One explanation for the above evidence is the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman (1985) , Odean (1998b) , whereby investors tend to sell the stocks for realization of profits after the stocks have appreciated, but to hold the stocks after the stocks have declined in prices. Another explanation for the above evidence is that investors gain confidence after the market experiences high returns (Odean (1998a and Gervais and Odean (2001) ). Although the returns are market-wide, but due to biased self-attribution, investors mistakenly attribute gains in stock trading to their ability to pick stocks. As a result, overconfident investors trade more frequently after the market performs well. Statman, Thorley, Vorkink (2006) provide strong supporting evidence. Based on a sample of U.S. common stocks, they find a statistically and economically significant positive relationship between market-wide turnover and lagged market-wide returns. Considering that our analysis is constrained to annual data, we include only contemporaneous market returns, and not lagged market returns. We expect a positive relation between contemporaneous returns of a market and the mutual fund turnover in that market.
(iii) Market volatility
The market volatility (VAR) is measured as the variance of 12-month contemporaneous stock market return, using country index return data from DATASTREAM. Many papers predict a positive relation between the absolute value of market returns and trading volume because more information arrives to investors when return movement is large. There is also well-established empirical literature supporting the relationship (see for example, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) ). We therefore predict a positive relation between market volatility and the mutual fund turnover in that market.
III. Empirical analysis
In this section, we study which categories of country variables can explain portfolio turnover of mutual funds across different countries. While the primary focus of our analysis is the turnover in foreign securities, we also examine whether those country variables can explain turnover in domestic securities.
This allows us to assess whether turnover in foreign securities are more sensitive to country-level characteristics than turnover in domestic securities.
An issue that we have to deal with is that the turnover of mutual funds is also affected by the fund objectives and characteristics. For example, actively managed funds will trade more frequently than passively managed funds, and funds invested into growth stocks will monitor the portfolio more closely than funds invested into value stocks. To remove the effect of fund characteristics on portfolio turnover, we use the adjusted turnover in our regression specifications. The adjusted turnover is calculated as follows: TURN across all countries j. Therefore, adjusted turnover represents the deviation of the turnover of fund i in country j from the average turnover of the fund i, so that we could focus on how it is affected by the characteristics of country j.
In all tests, we stack up the observations on foreign turnover, and pool them for a regression on a set of explanatory variables. All t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated based on clustered standard errors which adjust for the clustering at the fund level (Peterson (2005)).
One should be careful in interpreting the statistical significance of our results as we have a very large sample size. In assessing the significance of our results, besides relying just on standard level of statistical significance, we also form our judgment based on the consistency of effects of variables within the same category. Evidence of consistent signs for the explanatory variables within the same category is much more impressive in this regard than evidence of statistical significance for the explanatory variables but with inconsistent signs. Table 4 presents estimates of several specifications of the regression to explain the turnover in foreign securities.
A. Determinants of foreign turnover
The first regression specification shows that fund managers trade foreign securities more frequently in emerging markets and in countries with small market capitalization. This is contrary to the liquidity cost hypothesis as emerging markets and smaller stock markets should have lower liquidity that will drive the trading volume down. Rather, it is consistent with the hypothesis that there is more speculative trading in the developing markets. The positive and significant coefficient associated with the trading cost in the first specification and the insignificant coefficient in the full specification confirms that high trading cost does not discourage foreign turnover.
The second regression specification shows investor protection measures affect the trading intensity in the foreign markets. When a foreign market has less legal protection (lower LEGAL) and higher expropriation risk (lower EXPROP), fund managers will trade securities in that market more frequently. Therefore, foreign investors will increase their trading intensity in the market with poor legal system. Although the second regression specification has a contradictory result that foreign turnover is higher with better corporate governance (the dummy variable GOV being equal to 1 instead of 0), the same governance variable is not statistically significant in the full specification.
The third regression specification shows that mutual funds turnover their portfolio less in countries where more information is available. When a market has less than average disclosure standard (the dummy variable DMDISC being equal to 0 instead of 1) or is more opaque (higher OPACITY),
foreign fund managers will trade securities more frequently. Nevertheless, in the full specification, the significance of these two variables is strongly reduced.
The fourth regression specification shows that mutual funds turnover their portfolio more in countries that are less familiar to fund managers. The three familiarity variables (DIST, DMLANG, TRADEB) have the right signs, with DIST and TRADEB coefficients being statistically significant. The evidence indicates that mutual funds trade foreign securities more frequently if the host country is more remote from the foreign country or has less import and export trading with the foreign country. These results are consistent with the conjecture that fund managers trade in the foreign markets more frequently if they are less familiar with them.
The fifth regression specification is to introduce control variables. Of particular interest is that market returns (RET1) have a statistically positive impact on foreign turnover. This is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investors will pay more attention to the market and trade more actively only after the market experiences a positive performance.
In the last specification, all explanatory variables are introduced. Will so many explanatory variables, there bounds to have multi-collinearity , so that one has to interpret the coefficients with caution. That issue of mulit-collinearity will be discussed in the later section. Despite the collinearity, most of the coefficients keep their sign and statistical significance. For example, the turnover in foreign securities remains positively related to SIZE, negatively to LEGAL, positively related to DIST and negatively related to TRADEB.
B. Analysis based on standardized variables
The regression analyses so far are based on raw variables which differ in the magnitudes, making it difficult to compare the economic significance of the regression coefficients. Therefore, we transform the raw variables (except dummy variables) into standardized variables that have means of zero and standard deviations of one, and thus the regression coefficients can be compared.
We perform the regression analysis based on standardized variables for a number of specifications, with the results presented in Table 5 . In terms of the economic magnitude, the product of anti-director index and rule of law index (LEGAL) has the biggest effect, whereby a country with one standard deviation away from the average LEGAL will affect the adjusted turnover by 5%. This is followed by the market capitalization (SIZE) and physical distance (DIST), with a corresponding effect of 4% and 2%.
C. Analysis based on principal components of explanatory variables
With so many country variables in the regression analysis, it is sometimes difficult to interpret the signs and significance of the estimates from the full regression specifications, as some of the variables are highly correlated with each others. There is also ambiguity in interpreting some of the conflicting results for different variables within the same category. To help us better assess the results, we extract the first principal component from each category of explanatory variables, and estimate the regression results based on the principal component variables. Therefore, a higher value of PC_STOCKDEV indicates better stock market development, a higher value of PC_INVESTPROP indicates better investor protection, a higher value of PC_INFO indicates better information disclosure, and a higher value of PC_FAM indicates more familiarity. Table 7 reports the regression results on foreign turnover using these principal component It is interesting to examine the statistical significance of contemporaneous market return (RET1).
Again, the evidence is consistent with the attention hypothesis (Barber and Odean (2005)) whereby the less informed investors will pay more attention to the market and trade more actively only after the market experiences a positive performance. In our case, fund managers will pay less attention to the foreign market, so that the increased attention matters more after the foreign market performs well.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the regression results by including the interaction of PC_INFO and PC_FAM, after controlling for the direct effect of PC_INFO and PC_FAM . This is to assess whether is any additional effect on turnover in foreign securities, coming out of the interaction of information disclosure and familiarity. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, indicating that mutual funds are prone to trading most actively in countries that they are both less familiar with and less informed about.
D. Alternative measure of turnover based on lagged stock prices
The result that market returns (RET1) are positively related to turnover in foreign securities deserve special attention. As discussed previously, there is a well-documented relationship between stock market turnover and contemporaneous or lagged market returns. Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2006) find the positive relationship between market-turnover and past returns is prevalent in a number of countries, although the relationship is much stronger for developing countries than for developed ones. Statman, Thorley, Vorkink (2006) show that in the U.S. market, there is a positive relationship between individual firm turnover and lagged market-wide returns, even after individual firm returns are controlled.
Therefore, our evidence is consistent with previous findings in the literature.
It is, however, entirely possible that our evidence is due to the way that we construct our turnover measure as stated in Equation (2). It can be easily seen that if t , k P is higher than 1 t , k P − for most of the stocks in a country, this will have the effect of increasing the turnover measure. This could contribute to a positive relationship between market returns and our turnover measure. To circumvent this problem, we replace t , k P with 1 t , k P − in the numerator in Equation (2):
If we still find a positive relationship between market returns and turnover in securities, this cannot be attributed to the fashion we construct out turnover measure.
We estimate the regression equations as in Table 4 , except that we construct ij t TURN based on Equation (4). Results are reported in Table 8 . The evidence in Table 8 is generally similar to those in Table 4 . More importantly, the coefficient of market returns remains significantly positive. Therefore, the positive relationship between turnover in foreign securities and the corresponding market returns remains robust.
E. Effect of market returns
One explanation for the positive relationship between turnover and market returns is that investors face "information constraints", paying less attention to most of the securities but will increase their attention after the market performs well. Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2006) find that for the markets they can differentiate between individual and institutional investors, the relation is strongest among individual investors. This suggests that individual investors who have "limited attention" are more likely to base their trading decisions on behavioral heuristics (Barber and Odean (2005)). In our case, mutual fund managers face "information constraints", paying limited attention to some foreign markets until after they experience a positive performance.
The reason for why mutual fund managers pay little attention to foreign markets is that they are relatively uninformed about or unfamiliar with these markets. This behavioral bias could be attenuated if the fund managers can obtain more information or are more familiar with the foreign markets. For the foreign markets that they know more, they can pay enough attention and do not need a bull market run to increase their participation in these markets.
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between foreign turnover and foreign market returns will be reduced if the foreign country is more transparent or is more familiar to the fund managers. This motivates us to estimate a set of regression specifications in Table 9 whereby we examine how information disclosure and familiarity will affect the foreign turnover-market return relationship. In addition to those principal component variables associated with different categories of country characteristics, we include two interaction terms, PC_INFO*RET1 and PC_FAM*RET1, as explanatory variables. We estimate the regression equations using turnover measures based on either Equation (2) or Equation (4). Results are similar and for brevity, Table 9 reports regression results using turnover measure based on Equation (2). We find that while the coefficient estimate of RET1 remains statistically positive, the coefficient estimates of two interaction terms are significantly negative. This indicates that the positive relation between foreign turnover and market returns is weaker if investors know more about the foreign markets. In other words, the behavioral bias that affects the foreign turnover could be reduced if mutual fund managers have more information or are more familiar with the foreign market.
IV. Conclusion
Financial economists are always puzzled by the massive trading volume being observed in different financial markets. Even more puzzling is the still debatable stylized fact that investors tend to trade in foreign markets more frequently than in domestic markets (Tesar and Werner (1995), Warnock (2002) ) . This paper investigates this stylized fact, together with the possible factors that might explain it, using the trading turnover activity of mutual funds from a cross-section of countries around the world.
Consistent with the previous findings, turnover of mutual funds in foreign securities is higher than in domestic securities, although the difference is not as pronounced. We find that the cross-sectional variation of foreign turnover is strongly explained by a wide group of country characteristic variables.
Turnover in a foreign market is higher if the country is less developed, has less investor protection, less information disclosure, and is less familiar to the fund managers. Also, turnover in the foreign market is higher if the market performs well, although the relation is weaker for foreign markets with more information disclosure or that are more familiar to mutual fund managers.
The positive relation between turnover in foreign securities and information disclosure or familiarity is interesting. It suggests a reason for why investors trade more frequently in foreign markets is that they know less about them. Our evidence is consistent with Coval and Moskowitz (2001) who report that fund managers trade far more frequently in their distant holdings than in their local holdings.
Our result is also consistent with Merton (1987) that investors tend to hold the securities that are more recognized. In our sample, mutual fund managers will hold foreign securities much longer if they have more information about them, or are more familiar with them. For those foreign securities that they know little about, while they will purchase some of them, it appears that they will monitor them more closely, resulting in higher turnover in these securities.
Overall, evidence in our paper contributes to a better understanding of trading incentives of investors, especially in their cross-border portfolio flows. While there are many theories on the trading volume, we are not aware of any theoretical work in modelling the interaction between the trading activity of investors and characteristics of the securities or markets that they are investing into. We hope this paper will lead to the development of theoretical models that help us understand the propensity of investors to trade in the presence (or absence) of information about the securities. While it is a complex task, the payoff could be fruitful. (2005)) is above median, 0 otherwise; LEGAL is the product of anti-director index and rule of law index; EXPROP represents the risk of expropriation index; DIST (in km)is the geographic distance between the capitals of two countries; DLANG is a dummy of 1 if the host and target countries share a common language, 0 otherwise; TRADEB, between 0 and 1 (100%) is the share of trade between the two countries in the host country total trade; BIAS is the home bias measure to reflect the underweight of foreign investors in the target country; RET1 is the one-year contemporaneous local market return; VAR is the 12-month variance of the monthly stock market returns in that year. DIST, DLANG, TRADEB, and BIAS are calculated across funds of different host countries. The dependent variable is the foreign adjusted turnover of fund i in country j in year t , ADJ_TURN ij =(TURN ij -TURN i /)TURN i , where TURN ij is constructed based on lagged stock prices (prices in year t-1) as shown in Equation (4). There are five sets of explanatory variables: (1) Stock Market Development variables, including the emerging market dummy (DEMG), stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (SIZE), and transaction costs (COST); (2) Investor Protection variables, including a dummy variable measuring corporate governance (DGOV), the product of anti-director index and rule of law index (LEGAL), and the risk of expropriation index (EXPROP); (3) Information Disclosure variables, including disclosure standard (DMDISC) and financial opacity (OPACITY); (4) Familiarity variables, including geographic distance between capital cities in log form (DIST), a dummy equal to 1 if the host and target counties share a common language (DLANG), share of bilateral trade in the host country total trade (TRADEB); (5) Other control variables, including the home bias (BIAS), one-year contemporaneous local market return (RET1), and stock market return variance (VAR). The t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors. All models include unreported year effects. Table 9 : Regression analysis of foreign turnover on interaction of returns with the information and familiarity variables The dependent variable is the foreign adjusted turnover of fund i in country j in year t , ADJ_TURN ij =(TURN ij -TURN i /)TURN i . The independent variables are listed in the first column of the table. PC_STOCKDEV is the first principal component extracted from the Stock market development group of variables; PC_INFO is the first principal component extracted from the Information group of variables; PC_INVESTPROP is the first principal component extracted from the Investor Protection group of variables. PC_FAM is the first principal component extracted from the Familiarity group of variables. We also include other control variables, including the home bias (BIAS), one-year contemporaneous local market return (RET1), and stock market return variance (VAR). The independent variables include two interaction terms, interacting RET1 with PC_INFO and PC_FAM. The t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors. All models include unreported year effects. 
